I'm not an anti-terrorism expert, but a Muslim Intelligent with Arabic mother-tongue.. Therefore; I believe that the European in particular, and non-Muslim in general; are caught in historical and epistemic paradoxes.. The professional support given by Muslim governments had been generated by a bureaucratic system, not intelligentsia..!!
Historically, Anti-Terrorism is widely interpreted among Muslims as extension to the Crusade Wars.. Simply, they view the governing systems block spreading the word of Islam, and the believe in the singular Creator: Allah.. Therefore, the euphoria to convert to hard-line Islam is more appealing; specially among who seek pardon from their own sins and wrongdoing; as emotionally vulnerable by free or inmate radicals to acquire their own redemption..
Epistemically, Islamic laws and justice theory are contradicting to European ones, particularly in areas of abusing or murdering others.. The complex interpretations had evolved further by the firm stand from Muslim Scholars to prohibit denouncing belief affiliation of those who commit crimes against humanity.. Quoting: They still Muslim.. The convicted ones had known in advance that no capital or imputation punishment shall be applied; which relief them from the choice of self-bomb detonation or punishment at an Islamic justice or jail..
Therefore; Jihadism in Europe is more appealing than in the Muslim states.. Despite the anti-radicalism efforts; there are little; or almost no Muslim informers to provide intelligence about the active radicals.. The paradoxes above are effectively working.. Anti-terrorism psychology patterns and models confront lots of failure.. The current reduction of terrorist activities is widely due to drying-up-roots of Jihadism; along with serious (political) consensus among all stakeholders to bring it to an end..
There are critical borderlines between Islamic Belief and Arabic Linguistics; which had once enabled the spread of Islam, and yet undermine today's synergy.. In many controversial Islamic matters, the linguistic interpretations set the demise between Complacent and Aggressive Muslims.. Apparently, the lasting score on Radical-Islam requires serious collaboration among Arabic (yet Muslim intelligent) Linguistics and Anti-Terrorism experts.. This shall be the key to strip both active and potential Jihadists from their strong epistemic and emotional hold..
Old Trends, New Threats
While 2018 saw a decrease in the number of jihadist terrorist attacks in Europe, extremism still poses a strong threat. Currently two of the main challenges are radicalization in prisons and the imminent release of radicalized prisoners.
In most Western countries, prisons have long represented hubs for radicalization, where radicalized individuals can establish ties with each other, as well as engage in proselytism and recruit other inmates. The recent increase in arrests for terrorism-related charges has led to a swell in the radicalized prison population and endangered those considered to be “at risk” of radicalization, although this definition is often unclear and changes depending on the prison authorities of different European countries.
Thousands of jihadi extremists have been arrested across Europe over the course of the past five years, causing a spike in the radicalized prison population. According to Eurojust, most terms handed for terrorism related charges in the European Union are of five years in length – relatively short stints which place a high number of individuals in the near term release segment.
The latest attack in Strasbourg has highlighted this factor. The attacker, Cherif Chekatt, a 29-year old born in Strasbourg of North African origins, had 27 past-convictions and had been flagged by French Intelligence as having become radicalized during his time in prison.
The latest attack in Strasbourg has highlighted this factor. The attacker, Cherif Chekatt, a 29-year old born in Strasbourg of North African origins, had 27 past-convictions and had been flagged by French Intelligence as having become radicalized during his time in prison.
A joint ISPI-GWU Program on Extremism-ICCT study that I have worked on assessed jihadist terrorist attacks in the West following the declaration of the establishment of the Caliphate by Islamic State in June 2014. It found that almost a third of the attackers had spent time in prison prior to an attack. Some had been serving time for terrorism-related activity, while others had committed crimes unrelated to terrorism.
The profiles of the individuals analyzed were varied, as is often the case in extremism assessments. However, most had been serving sentences for drug-related crimes, possession of weapons, robbery, or physical violence and assault, as opposed to terrorism-related crimes. While the number is significant, the link between the radicalization of the individuals and the time spent in prison was harder to determine.
In the prison sphere, criminals and extremists are placed in close contact with one another, creating situations that can serve as an amplifier of radicalization. Common resentment is shared and at times the search for “redemption” for one’s crimes can lead down the dark path of radicalization and extremism. Certain criminals also possess skills – and connections – that can be useful for terrorist groups, such as knowing how to acquire and handle weapons.
The cell that carried out the attacks in Paris in 2015 reportedly used its previous criminal connections to obtain weapons – AK-47 variants from Eastern European countries that had been “demilitarized” and adapted to fire only blanks. They were then reconfigured and modified to be able to fire live ammunition.
Anis Amri on the other hand, who radicalized while in prison in Italy, had close links to a network of document forgers operating out of southern Italy. The connection between terrorists and document forgers has often been observed in terrorism cases in Italy, where figures such as Anwar Shabaan, a radical imam who became the emir of the Arab foreign fighters in Bosnia during the war in the 1990s, used to make fake documents for foreign fighters who traveled to wage jihad.
Similarly, the sale of narcotics was often used to provide funds to militant networks and for individuals who were seeking to purchase tickets to travel to the areas of conflict in Syria and Iraq.
As Rajan Basra and Peter Neumann of the ICSR have pointed out, Islamic State has exploited this link between the criminal world and terrorism. In its propaganda, the group has often touched upon this factor, at times conveying the message that “you do not need to change your behavior, only your motivation”. This could push criminals to embrace jihadism in the hope of acquiring redemption.
As Rajan Basra and Peter Neumann of the ICSR have pointed out, Islamic State has exploited this link between the criminal world and terrorism. In its propaganda, the group has often touched upon this factor, at times conveying the message that “you do not need to change your behavior, only your motivation”. This could push criminals to embrace jihadism in the hope of acquiring redemption.
With regards to jihadist terrorist attacks in the West, in total around 50% of attackers had criminal backgrounds in activity that ranged from terrorism activity to drug dealing and robberies.
France provides an example. The Ministry of the Interior has reported that there are approximately 500 individuals serving time in prison on terrorism related charges, while a little more than 1,200 prisoners have been labeled as being radicalized. Of these, at least 50 people serving terrorism-related sentences will be released in 2019, alongside 400 individuals who reportedly radicalized in prison. In an attempt to mitigate the risk tied to the release of radicalized prisoners, the 2018 French National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalization called for the creation of a permanent unit that would monitor these individuals once they are released from prison.
Similarly, in the UK there are reportedly 228 subjects in prison serving terrorism-related sentences. No fewer than 82% of them are Islamists, although the threat posed by other types of extremists, such as right wing radicals, should not be underestimated. Furthermore, over 40% of people sentenced for terrorism-related crimes over the last decade will have been released by the end of the year.
As in other European countries, most extremists tried for terrorism offences in the UK were given five-year terms at most and, according the British Ministry of Justice, of the 312 that have been released since 2014, 171 had served less than four years in prison.
In a case from May of this year, a prisoner on 48-hour leave in the Belgian city of Liege attacked and killed two police officers with a bladed weapon and shot a bystander. The attacker, a 36-year-old Belgian citizen named Benjamin Herman, had a long criminal record and had been in prison for drugs, assault and robbery. At the time of the attack, he was serving a short term in prison for drug related charges and had reportedly converted and become radicalized while incarcerated, although according to Belgian authorities, his radicalization “was not a clear-cut case”.
In another case from September 2016, a French individual named Bilal Taghi, who had been detained in the Osny prison in the outskirts of Paris, turned to violence while in prison when he attacked two corrections officers with a bladed weapon. The man had been arrested as he attempted to travel to Syria and join the Islamic State with two friends and his wife, and had pledged allegiance to the terror group.
The case of Djamel Beghal, Cherif Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly is perhaps the most telling on the topic of radicalization in prison.
Beghal, a Frenchman of Algerian origin, had served time over a thwarted al-Qaeda plot to attack the U.S. Embassy in Paris. Beghal had previously been arrested in 1994 for his connection to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), but only spent three months in prison. He then set off for England where he attended several radical mosques in London and Leicester, which French officials saw as being “Osama Bin Laden’s representatives in Europe”. Beghal engaged in activities such as disseminating propaganda, collection of funds, and even travelling to Afghanistan for training.
Beghal, a Frenchman of Algerian origin, had served time over a thwarted al-Qaeda plot to attack the U.S. Embassy in Paris. Beghal had previously been arrested in 1994 for his connection to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), but only spent three months in prison. He then set off for England where he attended several radical mosques in London and Leicester, which French officials saw as being “Osama Bin Laden’s representatives in Europe”. Beghal engaged in activities such as disseminating propaganda, collection of funds, and even travelling to Afghanistan for training.
It was during his internment in the Fleury-Megoris prison, the largest in France, that Beghal met and indoctrinated Kouachi and Coulibaly. Kouachi had been arrested as he attempted to travel to Iraq, while Coulibaly was a petty criminal. The two developed a strong bond with Beghal, despite the fact that Beghal was prohibited from seeing other inmates, and Beghal deepened their indoctrination and radicalization, setting in motion the chain of events that would eventually lead Coulibaly and Kouachi to the attack. Beghal was ultimately deported from France in July of this year.
The network involved in the 2016 Brussels bombings was also comprised of many individuals who had served time in prison. Brothers Ibrahim and Khalid El-Bakraoui, who detonated suicide vests in the Brussels airport and metro, had long been involved in the criminal world. The two had multiple convictions for carjacking and bank robberies and even attempted murder, as Ibrahim had opened fire with a Kalashnikov on police officers who were responding to a bank robbery. A eulogy by Dabiq, one the Islamic State’s official English language magazines, featured profiles on the two brothers. “While incarcerated, he followed the news about the atrocities against the Muslims in Shām. Something clicked and he decided to change his life, to live for his religion”, it claimed of Ibrahim. Similarly, his brother Khalid “was guided while in prison after having a vivid, life-changing dream”.
The piece in Dabiq also highlights the change in Khalid’s actions following his release, explaining how he began proselytizing and writing articles on the “crusades fought by the West against the Muslims”. It also goes on to explain how the two brothers acquired the weapons and explosives used in the attacks in Paris and Brussels. It is significant that these aspects are highlighted in jihadist propaganda: the change in ideology and motivation that takes place in prison and the acquisition of weapons on behalf of the brothers, who, having been bank robbers, had the necessary contacts to access assault rifles.
These are important aspects that the group purposely seeks to convey in the hope that others will take them as an example from and emulate the attackers. While much has been said about Islamic State’s support network in Europe, most attacks in the West were carried out by individuals who were rather loosely connected and affiliated to the group. Some were completely unconnected, in fact, while others have a “relationship” with the group limited to one or more individuals who did no more than influence them or introduce them to radical ideology. Ideological guides are part of the picture, but most attackers lacked actual established support groups that could supply them with weaponry, leading them to carry out attacks only with knifes or vehicles. For this reason, criminals who have their own contacts are particularly attractive to a group such as Islamic State, as they have the means and connections to acquire the weaponry and material needed for the execution of deadlier attacks.
Discussion:
Do you think the article needed to have
included some information about how prison authorities keep an eye on
development of radicalization among inmates? Also, in the UK I was commissioned
to deliver a programme to conduct theological dialogue with two terrorist
convicts who received life sentences that was focused on
Islamist-Jihadist-Extremism which I concluded only last December after eighteen
sessions. In my opinion, generally better results are obtained if the focus is
shifted away from de-radicalization by opening minds, developing maturity in
knowledge, critical thinking and ethical considerations for the human
conscience rather than pitting instructions based on contradictory teachings of
certain authorities or refutations.
Thankyou Jens. Very interesting article to
address the big challenge. Its vital to compose comprehensive systematic and
knowledge based solutions to counter the radicalisation process in the prisons.
There are number of gaps still exists with our prison setup, management and
cognitive rehabilitation of the prisoners. Looking at the biographies of the
individuals radicalised in jails and analysing their cognitive transitions its
huge diversity as driving variables and every variable is linked to thier mind
set there the process runs at some stage. Three categories of radicalised ones
have emerged out of my research, 1.radicalised angry and restrained
2.radicalised to violence and threatening to hate speech's 3.radicalised ready
to manage terror attack Surely , there are many other categories but now
analysing these cases, it shows firstly that our traditional correction and
rehabilitation tools are not able to counter the problem by looking these
individuals as mainstream prisoners. Why? Because the officers or any program
in the jail have not been holding operational value to map these mindset with
proper tool or method. Surely mapping of these mindset is not just meant to
look into history but .. continue in reply...
But its meant to analyse the mindset at its
present value , its dynamic system therein going through every cognitive entry
and exits, state of satisfaction and reactionary responses etc. Equally. All
lot of entries are response to a guilt and confused mind set therein they take
religion as one source of being satisfied until the mix of religious contents
with their existing unwanted retrievals under prison environment turn into
dangerous line of belief which truly is nothing to do with religion but a new
way of thier easy unwanted choice until they are free into the society as
dynamic threat. Now, question is how many experts in.our prison system are able
to map the mind set based on theological entries. Similarly. There are other
variables to map from thier running cognitive train of thoughts, acts exposures
attitude behaviour mindset diverse functions. Therefore, there is diversity
among these cases and we need to train our prison management to.meet the
challenge.I will add, that if in any prison, the experts to deradicalise, if
asked a simple question . How process runs , we will not have one answer but
again every one will explain according to his experience and observation or
learned definition. Continue..in reply
This witness that much more have to be done to
train our experts with correct contents to understand the process first as sole
process is same at all mind set, though driving variables are diverse and thats
why 1 intensity 2 direction are diverse from case to case. As a conclusion. We
must continue to upgrade our deradicalisation , correction and rehabilitation
tools, methods and knowledge bank not only in.prisons but at a whole for best
training to get true operational value.
The lack of resources at the disposal of jail
authorities help provide opportunities to terrorists t0 radicalise the
vulnerable fellow inmates. The jails in Pakistan are over-crowded and all
sorts of prisoners (including under trial, sent on judicial remand pending
start of trial proceedings, convicts - conventional or terrorists) are kept
together. In some instances, both terrorists and general prisoners are
lodged in one cell, which provides unhindered and unchecked grounds to the
terrorists to radicalise and recruit the fellow prisoners. Jails are, by and
large, fertile grounds for radicalisation. The world community must
provide adequate resources and know-how to the developing countries for
upgrading the jails so that the terrorists and the general prisoners are kept
segregated from each other. Unfortunately, the incarcerated terrorists
have access to mobile phones inside the jails enabling them to communicate with
the outer world - thanks to the systematic and institutionalised corruption of the
jail's staff.
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