Coup-proofing Strategies in Turkey and Egypt Through the Lens of Dominant Perceived Threat
Coup-proofing is a pivotal theme in civil-military relations, shaping the organization and behavior of security sectors across different states. Despite the general similarity in coup-proofing measures, their extent and prioritization vary according to a multitude of factors, chiefly the "dominant perceived threat" as seen by the power-holders. When rulers are primarily concerned with potential military coups, they often fragment their security sectors. This fragmentation is characterized by the creation of multiple security organizations with overlapping mandates, limited information-sharing, encouraged competition, prohibition of joint operations, and blocked horizontal communication channels. In such a scenario, the security sector lacks coordination mechanisms, and all communication channels are vertically controlled by the autocrats. Conversely, when the "dominant perceived threat" is popular unrest, a unitary security sector with more institutional coordination is preferred.
This paper examines how dominant perceived threats shape the organizational and behavioral dimensions of security sectors and, in turn, influence civil-military relations. It argues that dominant perceived threats – whether internal, such as military coups, or external, such as popular unrest – are pivotal in determining the structure, coordination, and autonomy of security institutions. By analyzing the cases of Turkey and Egypt, the paper explores how these organizational outcomes impact the balance of power between political and military elites, as well as the broader relationship between security sectors and society.
This comparative approach to Turkey and Egypt is analytically significant for several reasons. As is commonly known, both countries have experienced prolonged periods of military dominance but differ in how civil-military relations have evolved. In Turkey, civil-military relations generally – but not exclusively – refer to interactions between political elites and the military, with coup-proofing strategies largely aimed at reducing military autonomy and preventing military interventions in civilian governance. In Egypt, however, political elites and the military have become synonymous since the ascension of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in 2014. As a result, civil-military relations encompass the relationship between the political-military apparatus and the broader populace, and coup-proofing extends to "revolution-proofing" strategies that aim to suppress societal dissent and maintain regime stability.
The analysis adopts Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) as a conceptual lens, linking the perception of threats to structural and behavioral changes in the security sector and the broader implications for civil-military relations within these two countries. While in Turkey, the dominant perceived threat of a military coup was the catalyst for fragmenting the security sector, stripping the military of its autonomy, and ensuring civilian supremacy, in Egypt, the dominant perceived threat of a revolution drove the agents of coercion after 2013 to unite, share information and restructure coordination mechanisms under a hyper-militarized regime.
The Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) Framework
ITT, developed by Stephan and Stephan, provides a robust framework for analyzing perceived threats in civil-military relations. ITT categorizes threats into two primary types: realistic threats, which are tangible and often material (e.g., threats to security, sovereignty, or economic stability), and symbolic threats, which challenge a group’s ideological or cultural identity.1 Additionally, ITT highlights intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes as mechanisms that shape threat perceptions and influence group behavior. Over time, ITT has been applied to various contexts, including ethnic and racial conflicts, minority relations, and inter- and intra-state dynamics. Scholars like Stephan and Stephan have explored racial divides in the U.S., while others, such as Martinez and Fernandez, have examined threat perceptions in civilian-military dynamics concerning foreign policy.2
In the Middle East, the frequent clashes between civilian and military elites often stem from perceived threats rooted in ideological, political, and societal differences, making ITT a valuable lens for analyzing civil-military relations. This paper focuses on Turkey and Egypt as case studies to explore how dominant perceived threats influence coup-proofing strategies and broader civil-military dynamics. These two cases are particularly compelling due to their shared histories of strong military influence and divergent pathways since the early 2000s. Turkey’s political elites have sought to dismantle military tutelage, while in Egypt, the military has become increasingly entrenched in political authority, particularly since 2014.
ITT is particularly valuable for studying civil-military relations because it explains how perceptions of threat – whether realistic or symbolic – drive organizational behavior and institutional restructuring. Dominant perceived threats serve as the lens through which regimes evaluate risks, whether from the military, civil society, or external forces. For instance, in Turkey, political elites perceived the military as a primary realistic threat to their authority, prompting them to implement significant reforms, such as transforming the National Security Council (NSC) into an advisory body and enhancing parliamentary oversight of military expenditures. In Egypt, the symbolic threat of ideological opposition, coupled with the realistic threat of mass mobilization, has shaped efforts to centralize control and revolution-proof the regime.
The concept of dominant perceived threat, informed by ITT, is used in this paper to identify and analyze these threats in Turkey and Egypt. By tracing their evolution, the paper illuminates how these perceived threats inform coup-proofing strategies and their implications for civil-military dynamics.
Turkey: From Military Guardianship to Civilian (!) Supremacy
Turkey's history with military interventions has significantly shaped its coup-proofing strategies. The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have intervened in politics multiple times, notably through coups in 1960 and 1980, ultimatums/indirect interventions of 1971, 1997, and 2007, and a coup attempt in 2016. These interventions were driven by the military's self-perception as the guardian of a secular, modern state, a role it inherited from the late Ottoman Empire military culture and the early years of the Republic led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
Over the years, Turkey's coup-proofing strategies have evolved in response to shifting dominant perceived threats. Initially focused on avoiding military dissatisfaction, recent efforts aim to dismantle military autonomy and apparatus and ensure civilian supremacy. The Justice and Development Party (JDP) government, particularly post-2016, has adopted more systematic measures, including empowering alternative forces, reworking the separation of powers, strengthening intelligence services, and changing the military recruitment and education system. These shifts have fundamentally shaped the organization of the security sector and the nature of civil-military relations in the country.
Early Republic Years and Military Guardianship
In the Republic's early years, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk sought to mitigate military involvement in politics. Legislative measures and strategic appointments were employed to enforce civilian supremacy whilst ensuring loyalty and adherence to Atatürk's vision of a secular, modern state. However, the TAF retained a self-imposed role as the "guardians" of the secular state, reflecting their late Ottoman military heritage and the militarized foundation of the Republic. This particularly created tensions when Turkey moved to the multi-party system, and the incoming politicians started diverting from the secular visions of their predecessors. Eventually, having failed to implement significant coup-proofing measures, the civilian government created conditions that led to the first military intervention of the Turkish Republic in 1960.
Post-1960 Coup Dynamics
After the intervention of 1960, the coup-executing officers sought to protect themselves from legal repercussions and prevent potential counter-coups by drafting a new constitution and purging perceived disloyal officers. This constitution entrenched the military's role in politics even further and led to a cycle of fragile civilian governments destabilized by subsequent military interventions.
The perceived threat following the coup remained predominantly internal, with the military focusing on maintaining its guardianship of the secular state. This was further solidified first with the 1971 memorandum and later with the 1980 coup, which resulted in the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) and the 1982 constitution.
Military Tutelage and the 1980 Coup
The 1980 coup led to the peak of military tutelage in Turkey. The military justified its intervention by citing threats anywhere from the extreme left and political instability. During the three years of military rule, the TAF solidified its control over state institutions through extensive purges and constitutional changes. The 1982 constitution institutionalized military influence, creating a double-headed political system where the civilian government coexisted with the NSC.3 In this context, the perceived threat narrative was led by the military towards the anarchist separatist leftist groups.
Justice and Development Party (JDP) Era: Fragmentation and Civilian Supremacy
The rise of the JDP in 2002 coincided with a shift in dominant perceived threats. Initially, the military was viewed as the primary obstacle to the JDP’s authority, prompting the party to implement significant legal and institutional reforms aimed at reducing military autonomy while leveraging the EU accession process to justify its actions. These reforms included transforming the NSC into an advisory body, reducing military jurisdiction over civilian matters, and enhancing parliamentary oversight of military expenditures. The 2007 e-memorandum and the 2016 coup attempt further solidified the JDP’s resolve to dismantle military tutelage. More drastically than before, following the 2016 coup attempt, the government undertook a sweeping restructuring of the military, placing force commanders under presidential authority, transferring oversight of the Gendarmerie and Coast Guard to civilian ministries, and establishing new recruitment and training systems for prospective and current military personnel that emphasized ideological loyalty.
Turkey’s experience underscores how – ideologically and/or contextually motivated – shifting perceived threats reshape civil-military dynamics. The JDP’s efforts have fragmented the military, reducing its ability to act as a unified political force. While these measures have consolidated civilian supremacy, they also raise concerns about governance, as the reliance on ideological loyalty risks politicizing the security sector.
Egypt: From Coup-Proofing to Revolution-Proofing
The changing dominant perceived threat of the Egyptian republican regimes has accordingly altered how they organized their repressive apparatus. For almost seven decades, the security sector was fragmented by design, since the primary source of anxiety for Egypt’s rulers was the threat of a military coup. The 2011 revolution, however, forced the military and the different competing security agencies to unite against a new perceived existential threat of popular unrest.
1952 to 2011: A Fragmented Apparatus
The Egyptian repressive apparatus was born fragmented. In July 1952, the blueprint for the now-existing setup was structured and cemented at the hands of the Free Officers. The new regime came into existence via a military coup. The conspirators' immediate concern was securing their new regime from similar counter-conspiracies.
A labyrinth of security agencies was structured to counterbalance one another with overlapping mandates, a classic coup-proofing tactic in many autocracies. The security sector was broken down into the Interior Ministry and its secret police, the army and its military intelligence, and the newly founded General Intelligence Service (GIS). Their rivalry shaped Egyptian politics from their inception until the 2011 revolution.
2013: A Unitary Apparatus
Following almost three years of revolutionary upheavals that shook the state and threatened to bring down the foundations of the regime where the army was a powerful force in its ruling coalition, the military generals, led by then-defense minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, launched a coup in July 2013. What followed was not a restoration of Mubarak’s authoritarian formula. The generals established a new regime, imposing their direct rule without civil society or wide political alliance.4
Sisi sought to unify the repressive apparatus for the first time since 1952 to respond to the new dominant perceived threat of popular unrest. “The security concern now is the people, not a coup,” says historian Khaled Fahmy. “In the past the worries were always from a coup, which consequently led to the fragmentation of the state apparatus. In 2011, they realized that people are capable of a street revolt, so they have to prevent this from ever happening again.”5 Researchers of the Egyptian military, such as Sara Tonsy and Ali al-Raggal concur. “Although the overriding anxiety of the security and ruling apparatus in Egypt since 1952 has been a countercoup,” they wrote in 2021, “Sisi does not appear to face much risk in this regard.”6
Sisi methodically worked to bring all agencies under his centralized control to ensure a revolution did not happen again and attempted to foster coordination rather than competition.7 “The forces of repression saw a need for unity,” says Raggal. “They might have had intra-fights, but there was a bigger fight for survival.”8 Hisham Sabry, a former State Security Police officer, agrees. “Before 2011, there was competition between the security agencies,” he says. “Such competition ended after 2013.”9
Sisi oversaw the creation of a coordinating body comprising the security chiefs. The Military Intelligence (MI), GIS, and Homeland Security were now obliged to exchange all information they had gathered. Horizontal communication was encouraged. The new coordinating body liaises between them regularly. It neither has an official name nor legal status. It has been unofficially dubbed al-Khaliyya (Cell) or al-Laǧna al-ʾAmniyya (Security Committee).10
This coordinating body has represented the administrative hub for several councils formed or reactivated after the coup to guarantee coordination within the components of the repressive apparatus and other state organs.11 Unlike their predecessors under the previous regimes, where joint councils assumed a ceremonial nature or rarely convened, these councils have been holding regular meetings and coordinating policy under Sisi’s watchful eyes.12
Once the security sector institutions were streamlined, Sisi promoted their control over all state organs.13 A year and a half following the coup, Muhammad Ibrahim Mustafa, the Interior Minister, confidently spoke of a “golden age” of unity and solidarity between the military, police, and judiciary.14
These unitary structures include the National Defense Council, which was given in 2014 sweeping powers to oversee all matters related to security policy, just like in 2012.15 However, the new 2014 law on the council’s formation and mandate stipulated that the council had to convene regularly every three months, in addition to whenever the president summoned it or during a state of war.16 Such assertions on regular meetings at least once every three months had existed in the original 1957 and 1968 laws,17 but were conveniently ignored later. The council rarely met or exercised authority before the Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF) suddenly reactivated it on 14 June 2012.18 The move at the time was opposed by human rights organizations, who denounced it as an attempt by the SCAF to enforce military domination over the state before handing power to an elected civilian president.19
The National Defense Council consists of 14 members: the president, prime minister, parliament speaker, Foreign Minister, Interior Minister, finance minister, GIS director, Defense Minister, Army Chief of Staff, MI director, commander of the navy, commander of the air force, commander of the air defense, and head of the Armed Forces Operations Authority.20
Each 2012 and 2014 constitution included an article that tackled the formation and composition of a National Security Council that oversees policies related to natural disaster relief, food security, and economic crises.21 The council’s secretariat is organized by the presidency, which controls its budget.22 The 2014 law governing its work stressed the council must meet at least once every three months.23
War on the People
The unity of the agents of coercion after the coup to face the dominant perceived threat of popular unrest has meant an unprecedented level of carceral and lethal violence in the country. For instance, the death toll on a single day, 14 August 2013, nearly amounts to the death toll of the entire 1990s decade of counterinsurgency under Mubarak. The Rabaa and Nahda killings are the biggest massacre in Egypt’s modern history.24
During the initial seven months alone, the state crackdowns and the ensuing violence after the coup left at least 3,248 dead, 90% of which were civilians.25 By the end of Sisi’s first presidential term in 2018, the state “wars on terror and crime” was killing, on average, two Egyptian citizens daily since the coup. During the same period, the courts sentenced at least 2,658 defendants to death.26
Since the coup, at least 34 new Interior Ministry-run prisons had been built by 2021.27 No accurate figures of the political prisoner population are available. Some estimates went up to 60,000 in the year following the coup. By 2022, they were anywhere between 20,000 and 30,000.28
Coup-Proofing in Egypt and Turkey: Different Paths, Shared Goals
In conclusion, both Egypt and Turkey have developed distinct coup-proofing strategies shaped by their unique historical and political contexts. Egypt's approach, characterized by a shift from a fragmented to a unitary security apparatus, reflects the regime's focus on countering popular unrest as the dominant perceived threat. This centralization under Sisi aims to prevent revolutionary upheavals similar to those witnessed in 2011. Two factors need further scrutiny to see how the current formula will play out in the near future.
First, the unification of the Egyptian repressive apparatus also involved an expansion in the footprint of the military in the civilian economy for several reasons, including Sisi’s worldview that regards the army as a superior institution and a perfect model to reorganize the whole society and state, and ensuring the loyalty of the officer corps with such perks.29 However, Sisi is under pressure from international donors to privatize such military firms and limit their role, since they manipulate the free market forces with a package of laws that gives them an unfair advantage compared to their civilian counterparts in relation to taxes, tariffs, and permits. The regime has been stalling with such a move, announcing several times over the past three years its intention to privatize some of those firms, but never managed to pull it together, since simply this could antagonize the brass.30 This month, the government announced it will be listing four companies in the stock market in 2025.31 Will it happen? Will other firms follow suit? Will other direct/indirect perks compensate the military? This remains to be seen and will impact whether the perceived threat of a military coup could regain its dominance and hence re-fragment once again the security sector.
Second, while Sisi’s unified security sector eradicated the opposition and dismantled basically any entity independent of the state and capable of mobilizing, will this unity endure if a spontaneous explosion of dissent driven by deteriorating socio-economic conditions occurs? The unprecedented level of repression following the 2013 coup was partially enabled by the widespread support enjoyed by Sisi in his early days. Yet, such clout was gradually lost in the following years, thanks to economic blunders and white elephant projects. While the top brass and substantial section of the repressive apparatus will be solidly behind him in fighting this existential threat, how will lower ranks and conscripts in the military and police behave if they are faced with a national social uprising over a prolonged period, not affiliated with any organization or political party?
Conversely, Turkey’s coup-proofing strategy has centered on the systematic dismantling of military autonomy. This historic strategy was particularly intensified following the 2016 coup attempt. This shift reflects a broader redefinition of "security" and "state security" under the JDP, where threats have increasingly been framed in terms of political opposition and dissent. The military’s historic role as a guardian of secularism has been supplanted by its subordination to civilian leadership, consolidating the ruling party’s authority.
By reducing the military’s institutional independence and embedding ideological loyalty through new recruitment and training systems, the JDP has ensured the security apparatus aligns with its political objectives. The reconfiguration of civil-military relations underscores a critical divergence from Egypt: while Turkey has depoliticized its military to reinforce civilian supremacy, Egypt has militarized its civilian sphere to consolidate power.
These contrasting trajectories reveal how perceived threats shape not only the structure of the military-security apparatus but also the broader strategies employed by regimes. In Turkey, this evolution has enabled the JDP to entrench its rule while reshaping the state’s understanding of security, leaving open questions about the long-term implications for democratic governance and civil-military dynamics.
Ultimately, the contrasting trajectories of civil-military relations in Turkey and Egypt illustrate how regimes adapt their military-security apparatus to perceived threats, employing divergent strategies that reflect their unique historical and political contexts. These approaches, while differing in execution, highlight a common logic: the instrumentalization of security structures to maintain power, revealing the intricate interplay between perceived threats, institutional design, and regime durability.
Endnotes
| ↑1 | Walter G. Stephan and Cookie White Stephan, “An integrated threat theory of prejudice”, in Stuart Oskamp, ed. Reducing prejudice and discrimination, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2000. |
|---|---|
| ↑2 | Rafael Martínez and Antonio Manuel Díaz Fernández, “Threat Perception: New Risks, New Threats and New Missions”, in Guiseppe Caforio, ed. Cultural Differences between the Military and Parent Society in Democratic Countries: Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Vol. 4, Emerald Group Publishing, 2007. |
| ↑3 | Ümit Cizre, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy.” Comparative Politics 29, no. 2 (1997), 157-158. https://www.jstor.org/stable/422077. |
| ↑4 | Robert Springborg, Egypt, Hot Spots in Global Politics Series (Cambridge: Polity, 2018), 47. |
| ↑5 | Khaled Fahmy, In-person meeting in Berlin, October 17, 2022. |
| ↑6 | Sara Tonsy and Ali al-Raggal, “How Did Sisi Reproduce Authoritarianism in Egypt?,” Rowaq Arabi 26, no. 1 (2021). |
| ↑7 | Tonsy and Raggal, 59. |
| ↑8 | Ali al-Raggal, In-person meeting in Berlin, September 22, 2022. |
| ↑9 | Hisham Sabry, Zoom call, December 8, 2022. |
| ↑10 | Raggal, interview; Sabry, interview. |
| ↑11 | Raggal, interview. |
| ↑12 | Raggal. |
| ↑13 | Mahmoud Hamad, Judges and Generals in the Making of Modern Egypt: How Institutions Sustain and Undermine Authoritarian Regimes (2019). |
| ↑14 | Ṣāliḥ Ramaḍān, “Wazīr al-Dākhiliyya: naʿīš ʿaṣr ḏahabī li-takātuf al-qaḍāʾ maʿ al-šurṭa wa-l-ǧayš,” al-Watan, December 24, 2014. |
| ↑15 | Chérine Chams El-Dine, “Egypt: From Military Reform to Military Sanctuarization,” in Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Spring (2016). |
| ↑16 | “Qānūn raqam 21 li-sanat 2014,” al-Ǧarīda al-Rasmiyya, February 25, 2014, art. 2. |
| ↑17 | “Qarār Raʾīs al-Ǧumhūriyya bi-l-qānūn raqam 178 li-sanat 1957,” al-Waqāiʿ al-Miṣriyya, July 13, 1957, art. 3; “Qarār Raʾīs al-Ǧumhūriyya bi-l-qānūn raqam 86 li-sanat 1968,” December 18, 1968, art. 4. |
| ↑18 | Chams El-Dine, “Egypt,” 190; “Qarār Raʾīs al-Maǧlis al-Aʿla li-l-Quwwāt al-Musallaḥa raqam 348 li-sanat 2012,” al-Ǧarīda al-Rasmiyya, June 14, 2012. |
| ↑19 | “Munaẓẓamāt ḥuqūqiyya taṭaʿn ʿalā qarār al-Mušīr Ṭanṭāwī bi-taškīl Maǧlis al-Difāʿ al-Waṭanī” (Cairo: EIPR, June 23, 2012). |
| ↑20 | Article 203 in “Iṣdār Dustūr Ǧumhūriyyat Miṣr al-ʿArabiyya al-muʿaddal li-sanat 2014,” al-Ǧarīda al-Rasmiyya, January 18, 2014. |
| ↑21 | Article 193 in “Iṣdār Dustūr Ǧumhūriyyat Miṣr al-ʿArabiyya li-sanat 2012,” al-Ǧarīda al-Rasmiyya, December 25, 2012; Article 205 in “Dustūr Miṣr 2014.” |
| ↑22 | “Qarār Raʾīs al-Ǧumhūriyya bi-l-qānūn raqam 123 li-sanat 2015,” al-Ǧarīda al-Rasmiyya, December 29, 2015. |
| ↑23 | “Qarār Raʾīs al-Ǧumhūriyya bi-l-qānūn raqam 19 li-sanat 2014,” al-Ǧarīda al-Rasmiyya, February 24, 2014, art. 2. |
| ↑24 | Omar Shakir, “All According to Plan: The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt” (HRW, 2014). |
| ↑25 | “Ḥaṣr qatla ʿahd al-Sīsī/ʿAdlī Manṣūr tafṣīliyyan (muḥaddath) ḥattā 31 Yanāyir 2014” (Cairo: Wiki Thawra, 2014). |
| ↑26 | Hossam el-Hamalawy, “Egypt Under Sisi 2013 - 2018” (Berlin: Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, October 30, 2018). |
| ↑27 | “Waiting for You: 78 Prisons, including 35 Built After the January Revolution” (Cairo: ANHRI, April 11, 2021), sec. Fifth. |
| ↑28 | Haitham Muhammadein, Personal communication, December 23, 2022. |
| ↑29 | For more information, see Yezid Sayigh, “Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of Egypt’s Military Economy,” The Program on Civil-Military Relations of the Arab States (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 18, 2019). |
| ↑30 | Hossam el-Hamalawy, “Why Egypt’s ‘New Republic’ Is Increasingly Vulnerable to Implosion,” Middle East Eye, June 28, 2024. |
| ↑31 | Rehab Magdy, “Four Egyptian Armed Forces-Affiliated Companies to Go Public in 2025: PM Madbouly,” Ahram Online, December 11, 2024. |
The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.
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