Coup-proofing Strategies in Turkey and Egypt Through the Lens of Dominant Perceived Threat
Coup-proofing is a pivotal theme in civil-military relations, shaping the organization and behavior of security sectors across different states. Despite the general similarity in coup-proofing measures, their extent and prioritization vary according to a multitude of factors, chiefly the "dominant perceived threat" as seen by the power-holders. When rulers are primarily concerned with potential military coups, they often fragment their security sectors. This fragmentation is characterized by the creation of multiple security organizations with overlapping mandates, limited information-sharing, encouraged competition, prohibition of joint operations, and blocked horizontal communication channels. In such a scenario, the security sector lacks coordination mechanisms, and all communication channels are vertically controlled by the autocrats. Conversely, when the "dominant perceived threat" is popular unrest, a unitary security sector with more institutional coordination is preferred.
This paper examines how dominant perceived threats shape the organizational and behavioral dimensions of security sectors and, in turn, influence civil-military relations. It argues that dominant perceived threats – whether internal, such as military coups, or external, such as popular unrest – are pivotal in determining the structure, coordination, and autonomy of security institutions. By analyzing the cases of Turkey and Egypt, the paper explores how these organizational outcomes impact the balance of power between political and military elites, as well as the broader relationship between security sectors and society.
This comparative approach to Turkey and Egypt is analytically significant for several reasons. As is commonly known, both countries have experienced prolonged periods of military dominance but differ in how civil-military relations have evolved. In Turkey, civil-military relations generally – but not exclusively – refer to interactions between political elites and the military, with coup-proofing strategies largely aimed at reducing military autonomy and preventing military interventions in civilian governance. In Egypt, however, political elites and the military have become synonymous since the ascension of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in 2014. As a result, civil-military relations encompass the relationship between the political-military apparatus and the broader populace, and coup-proofing extends to "revolution-proofing" strategies that aim to suppress societal dissent and maintain regime stability.
The analysis adopts Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) as a conceptual lens, linking the perception of threats to structural and behavioral changes in the security sector and the broader implications for civil-military relations within these two countries. While in Turkey, the dominant perceived threat of a military coup was the catalyst for fragmenting the security sector, stripping the military of its autonomy, and ensuring civilian supremacy, in Egypt, the dominant perceived threat of a revolution drove the agents of coercion after 2013 to unite, share information and restructure coordination mechanisms under a hyper-militarized regime.
