The broader and frequently asked question is: Was Saudi Arabia a religious state that later changed? Has Vision 2030 altered the relationship between religion and the state? Has religion diminished, or has its method of presentation evolved?
These questions do not only confuse non-Muslims; many Muslims also struggle with them. They have been among the core issues explored extensively in a book exceeding 4,000 pages, due to the subject’s complexity and its deep roots in both religious and political understanding.
But before attempting to answer, it's crucial to understand a fundamental point: The common classifications such as “religious state,” “secular state,” “civil state,” or “theocracy” face two primary problems:
▪️ Each of these terms has conflicting definitions that vary by historical and cultural context.
▪️ The Saudi governance system does not fully fit any of them, neither in its foundations nor in its current form.
For this reason, these classifications will be set aside. This article will instead explore a more realistic model, one that aligns more honestly with the Saudi context and respects the complexity of its experience.
It will examine the role of religion within the Saudi state, the changes that have taken place and why, and the foundational sources behind these developments: What is the role of Sharia in the system? Does religion have absolute authority or serve as a flexible reference? Do scholars legislate, or are they consulted? Is religion in Saudi Arabia something proclaimed or something practiced?
All of this will be addressed not through the lens of journalism or Western political classifications, but from the standpoint of Islamic jurisprudence itself.
Let’s begin by understanding why the Western model of “state vs. religion” simply doesn’t fit here.
The global debate about the relationship between religion and the state does not originate in the Islamic tradition. Rather, it comes from a specific European historical context.
▪️ In medieval Europe, the Catholic Church imposed its authority over minds and wealth. It owned land, treated people as its subjects, and controlled their fate in the name of "eternal salvation." Some branches even prohibited scientific inquiry, criminalized scholars such as Galileo, and burned those who dared challenge its interpretation of revelation.
As a result of this dominance, secular movements arose not in opposition to faith itself but as a rebellion against the Church’s monopoly on power that reduced religion to a tool of control.
This conflict between religion and state never existed in the foundations of Islamic jurisprudence. Islam has no priesthood, no monopoly on interpretation, and no religious intermediary between the human being and God.
On the contrary, Islam institutionalized consultation (shura), allowed for human reasoning (ijtihad), and distinguished clearly between agreed-upon fundamentals and matters open to diverse opinions.
Imposing these Western categories, with their historical tensions and assumptions, onto the Saudi model is intellectually misleading and distorts the true nature of the Saudi experience.
Between Politicizing Religion and Practicing It: Three Divergent Models
Although the historical conflict between church and state was not part of Islamic history, some contemporary experiences in the Muslim world have unfortunately reproduced the same crisis by politicizing religion or deifying its leaders.
▪️ In Iran, the system of "Wilayat al-Faqih" (Guardianship of the Jurist) was founded on the idea that the top religious scholar is the highest authority in the state. He is not elected by the people but is granted absolute powers in the name of Islamic law. He controls domestic and foreign policy, standing above the president, parliament, and even the constitution.
▪️ In some political Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, religion was turned into a partisan slogan. Religious texts were used as tools for mobilization. Representing Islam became monopolized within an organizational framework that excluded those who did not follow it.
🔸 Despite their differences, these models share a dangerous commonality: They transform religion from an open moral reference into a closed tool of power, used to justify decisions rather than to evaluate or correct them.
In contrast, the Saudi model stands on the opposite end of the spectrum.
- There is no party that monopolizes religion.
- No jurist is empowered above the state.
- No religious rhetoric is marketed as a tool for domination.
Instead, Saudi Arabia is grounded in a genuine conviction: Religion is not a political project but a moral one. Lived practice is more truthful than verbal claims. Respecting Sharia does not mean reducing it to a person or turning it into a political slogan.
Sharia Left Ample Room for Human Reasoning
Before we delve into the question "What is an Islamic state in Islamic jurisprudence?", it is important to clarify a pivotal idea that shifts the entire perspective.
Islamic Sharia, as understood by sincere scholars across centuries—those who did not mix sacred texts with their personal or partisan agendas—did not come to dictate every tiny detail of life. Rather, it established grand principles and higher objectives (maqasid), and then left broad space for human reasoning and contextual judgment.
To illustrate this, we will focus on just three examples (though there are many), each revealing a different dimension of Sharia’s flexibility, depth, and respect for real-life conditions.
The Story of Palm Tree Pollination
The Prophet ﷺ once saw people pollinating palm trees and remarked, "If you didn’t do this, it might still be fine." The companions thought this was divine instruction and ceased pollination, leading to poor date yield. When they told him, he famously said, "You are more knowledgeable about your worldly affairs." This was not just an agricultural note, but a foundational principle affirming an independent domain for evaluating worldly benefit. It showed that religion refines human reasoning rather than replacing it.
Umar ibn al-Khattab and the Suspension of the Theft Punishment During Famine
Umar ibn al-Khattab (d. 644 CE), the second caliph after the Prophet and the second most revered figure in Islam after him, suspended the prescribed punishment for theft during a year of famine, even though it is explicitly stated in the Quran. The deeper wisdom lies in understanding that the punishment was originally legislated as a form of mercy—to protect property and deter aggressors. In that context, applying it would have unjustly punished the starving. Umar understood that the same mercy that justified the punishment also justified its suspension. This reflects Sharia’s compassion and its ability to adapt without losing its core.
The New Fiscal System in Umar’s Era
Umar implemented an unprecedented administrative and financial system inspired by the Persians—even though they were adversaries, and one eventually assassinated him. He prioritized benefit over bias and adopted what served the Muslim community. He introduced state registers (diwan), and allocated public funds based on merit, not equality alone. Though not directly from the Prophet ﷺ, this system aligned with Islamic values and state needs. It became an early model of institutional governance within Sharia.
These examples reflect a core principle in Islamic jurisprudence: "Take the truth from whoever brings it, regardless of their background, color, or creed—so long as it serves justice and benefits the people."
Sharia is not a rigid system that traps people in fixed molds. It is a flexible reference that directs society toward ethical aims while allowing space for thoughtful legislation and leadership.
This approach is called Siyasah Shar‘iyyah (Sharia-based governance). It refers to the authority of the ruler and state institutions to issue laws and policies that serve the people and protect the public good, as long as they align with both the letter and spirit of Islamic teachings.
What Is an Islamic State in Islamic Jurisprudence?
After understanding that Sharia leaves wide space for human reasoning, the natural next question arises: What, then, is an Islamic state according to the scholars of Islamic jurisprudence?
Does it require being officially labeled "Islamic"? Must it be led by religious scholars? Should it be measured by how often religious rhetoric is repeated?
The answer is simple: no.
This is why classical jurists wrote dozens of volumes on siyasah shar‘iyyah (Sharia-based governance), to clarify how an Islamic state is managed. These writings explain how divine texts and human judgment can complement each other, how law and reality can interact without conflict or contradiction.
In Islamic jurisprudence, what matters is not the label, but the essence.
A state that upholds justice, implements Sharia through its laws and systems, respects its objectives (maqasid), works to accumulate public benefit and prevent harm—this is a state that practices Islam, even if it does not use the word “Islamic” in its official name.
Imam al-Mawardi wrote, “The imamate exists to succeed prophethood in guarding religion and managing worldly affairs.” In other words, the ruler in Islam protects religion not through speeches but through legislation and enforcement, and manages public life in line with the objectives of Sharia, not in isolation from them.
Referring to Sharia in governance does not come in only one form. There are two main types of legal recourse in Islamic jurisprudence:
- Recourse to clear textual rulings, such as those related to marriage, divorce, inheritance, and criminal penalties—areas where direct texts exist.
- Recourse to administrative legislation, where the ruler enacts laws that serve the public good, as long as they do not contradict any explicit religious text and remain faithful to the objectives of Sharia.
These objectives have been summarized by scholars into what is known as the Five Necessities:
- Protection of religion
- Protection of life
- Protection of intellect
- Protection of honor and dignity
- Protection of wealth and property
Any policy that upholds these necessities, prevents harm, and aligns with wisdom and justice is considered compatible with the spirit of Sharia, even if it is not explicitly mentioned in the Quran or Hadith.
This is the distinction between the Islamic model and others: In Islam, religion is not a tool to sanctify rulers or shield them from accountability. Rather, it is a reference that binds them, limits them, and at the same time gives them the flexibility to legislate and govern for the public good.
How Is the State Understood in Islamic Jurisprudence?
Let us begin with a point that clarifies the picture before diving into how and when a state aligns with the Islamic vision.
Contrary to some misconceptions, Islamic Sharia did not prescribe a rigid system of governance detailing every aspect of rule. Instead, it provided overarching principles and general rules, while leaving a broad space for human reasoning—what Islamic scholars have long called siyasah shar‘iyyah (Sharia-based governance).
This concept does not mean politicizing religion. Rather, it refers to the use of political tools and state institutions in a way that fulfills the objectives of Sharia and serves the public interest.
For this reason, classical scholars wrote extensively on siyasah shar‘iyyah, emphasizing that rulers have wide discretion, as long as they uphold the core principles of the religion, maintain justice, and align with wisdom.
At the heart of these principles are the Five Necessities: the protection of religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property. Any system that upholds these necessities and prevents transgressions against them falls within the bounds of Sharia-based governance.
One of the most powerful historical examples of this flexibility is what Umar ibn al-Khattab (d. 644 CE) did during the "Year of Famine." He suspended the punishment for theft, even though it is explicitly mentioned in the Quran. He understood that this punishment was legislated as a mercy to protect people’s property. Enforcing it during widespread hunger would have punished people for being hungry, not for stealing. So he showed mercy—because the Quran itself had descended as a mercy.
In another example, Umar adopted the diwan system from the Persians, despite them being adversaries. One of them even assassinated him. Still, he took what was beneficial and did not reject it due to its origin.
This was the understanding of the early companions and scholars: “Act according to what the religion requires of you, not just what you speak in its name.”
Thus, Sharia does not demand a specific structure of state or a fixed form of governance. It is understood and applied according to context, so long as it serves justice and protects the people.
Does the Ruler Have to Be a Religious Scholar? And What Is the Role of Scholars?
It is often assumed—especially by those observing Islam from a distance—that an Islamic state is not complete unless the ruler himself is a prominent religious scholar, or at least someone expected to lead the religious discourse.
But the truth is more nuanced and balanced.
In Islamic jurisprudence, the ruler is not required to be the most knowledgeable in religion. What is required is that he be the most qualified to govern and best suited to manage public affairs—while grounding his authority in Sharia, even if he does not speak in its name.
Ibn Taymiyyah famously stated: "The obligation in appointing an imam is to choose the most capable for leadership, whether he is a jurist or not."
Throughout Islamic history, caliphs were not always scholars. Rather, they were rulers who managed the state and consulted scholars to issue religious rulings, interpret legal matters, and address new developments.
For instance, in both the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 CE) and the Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258 CE), which spanned centuries, most rulers were not among the top jurists. Yet they led a diverse and vast Islamic world, under whose reign universities flourished, sciences advanced, and inventions emerged that would shape world history.
Examples include:
- The water clock and complex gear systems, invented by the Banu Musa brothers in 9th-century Baghdad. These machines operated with remarkable precision for their time.
- Algebra as an independent science, developed by Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi, whose work became the foundation of modern mathematics.
- The science of optics, pioneered by Ibn al-Haytham in Cairo, who proved that vision results from light reflecting off objects into the eye.
- Advanced surgical techniques, initiated by al-Zahrawi in Córdoba, who invented tools and wrote a medical encyclopedia that was translated and used in Europe for centuries.
- Institutions like observatories and hospitals, from Baghdad to Córdoba, where students were trained, patients treated, and knowledge systematically developed—at a time when Europe was still prescribing charms for the ill.
None of these achievements came despite Sharia, but because of it—when it was understood correctly as a framework that uplifts the mind, encourages reason, and treats beneficial knowledge as a form of worship when used to serve humanity.
In this model, scholars are not rulers but judges, legal experts, and trusted advisors. They are consulted just as one consults a doctor in medicine or an economist in finance. Their role is to clarify, not to control. They issue fatwas, interpret texts, and make reasoned judgments without being revered or monopolizing decision-making.
As Ibn al-Qayyim said: "Some fatwas are accepted, others are rejected. What matters is the evidence upon which they stand."
Scholars themselves acknowledge this. They remind us that they are human, capable of error and correction. They do not claim infallibility or exclusivity over truth.
The guiding principle remains: Authority rests not in status, but in evidence.
The Andalusian Model: When Faith Empowered Reason
One of the most powerful historical examples of harmony between religion and reason was the experience of Al-Andalus under Muslim rule.
Al-Andalus did not invent a new model of religion. It simply extended the same jurisprudential practice that had spread across the East. What made it distinctive was its proximity to Europe and its direct confrontation with the boundaries of Western knowledge at the time.
At its peak, Andalusia was a beacon of progress, while much of Europe remained in intellectual darkness. A bitter paradox unfolded: Just a few hundred kilometers from Córdoba, scientists like Galileo were being tried and burned in the name of religion—while in Muslim Andalusia, scholars were being honored and supported, also in the name of religion.
While Europe condemned thinkers as heretics, Muslim Spain celebrated them. That is why the French historian Dozy (Ernest Renan) once remarked: "The Arabs enlightened Europe during its darkest hours."
Galileo, facing the Inquisition, sarcastically insisted: "And yet... it moves." —referring to his belief that the earth moves around the sun, despite the Church's condemnation.
The greater irony is that the Quran itself contains verses that inspired scientific reflection: "The sun runs on its appointed course" "Each in an orbit floating" "Nor does night outstrip the day..."
These early cosmological references encouraged Muslim scientists to question, investigate, and expand their understanding of the universe. Faith was not a barrier to inquiry—it was the spark that ignited it.
This is why Andalusia produced towering figures such as:
- Al-Zahrawi in medicine, whose surgical instruments and writings became standard references in Europe.
- Abbas Ibn Firnas in aviation, who attempted one of the earliest human flights.
- Ibn Rushd in philosophy and logic, who defended reason as a path to understanding revelation.
- Ibn Bajjah in mathematics, along with hundreds of others who laid the intellectual foundation for Europe's Renaissance.
Here, religion was not a tool of repression but a framework for renewal. It was not in conflict with science—it propelled it.
Saudi Arabia: When Religion Became a Lived Reality, Not a Slogan
🔅 Now that we have explored how Islamic jurisprudence understands the state, and reviewed historical models where faith and governance coexisted productively, we return to the question that has puzzled many:
Is Saudi Arabia a religious state? Or is it something different? Was it once a religious state that later changed? Did Vision 2030 alter the nature of the relationship between religion and the state? Has religion diminished, or has its expression evolved?
As explained at the outset, imported labels such as “religious state,” “theocracy,” or “secular state” do not help in understanding the Saudi experience—neither in their connotations nor in their context. It is more accurate to examine the Saudi model as it is, without borrowed frameworks.
Saudi Arabia is not a religious state in the Western sense, where clergy rule in the name of heaven. Nor is it a secular state that separates religion from public life. Rather, it represents a rare model in today’s world: A direct extension of the balanced approach that characterized the Umayyad (661–750 CE), Abbasid (750–1258 CE), and Andalusian (711–1492 CE) caliphates.
It follows the same methodology—upholding the balance between Sharia and real life. It does not shut the door to ijtihad (independent reasoning), nor does it empty religion of its substance. It offers a practical application of what the Quran and Sunnah call for, in a form that combines devotion to faith with care for people’s welfare—without extremism or neglect.
In Saudi Arabia, religion is not a means of control. It is a source of legislation, an ethical compass, and a moral reference point.
Its status is enshrined in the Basic Law of Governance, which states in Article 1: “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state. Its religion is Islam, and its constitution is the Book of God and the Sunnah of His Messenger.”
But this religious foundation does not mean that clerics rule the country, nor that scholars draft its laws. Rather, it means that the state derives its legitimacy from Sharia, while adapting to changing times, places, and public interests. This is the role of siyasah shar‘iyyah, as explained by generations of scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Mawardi, al-Shatibi, and al-Izz ibn Abd al-Salam.
Because Sharia is rooted in the protection of the five universal necessities—religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property—Saudi public policy consistently prioritizes:
- Ensuring security and protecting lives
- Delivering healthcare and improving quality of life
- Promoting education and expanding job opportunities
- Advancing economic and urban development to secure dignity and sufficiency
In this model, religion is not an election platform. It is a way of life guided by conscience.
You might sit with a Saudi who never explicitly talks about religion, yet lives it through honesty in contracts, keeping promises, valuing knowledge, and caring for his society’s wellbeing.
Importantly, Saudis are proud of their religion. They do not tolerate disrespect toward it. At the same time, they are open to dialogue and distinguish between explaining their faith and imposing it.
For them, religion is not about slogans but conduct. Not about rhetoric, but action. Not about protest, but character.
This is why you find a state that has modern institutions managed through tools of planning and economics—side by side with religious bodies like the Council of Senior Scholars. This council is consulted in complex matters and issues collective fatwas with detailed explanations, including names of those who agree and those who dissent, along with the reasoning behind each position.
The divine command in Islam is to understand the law before enforcing it, to seek clarity rather than blind imitation. This prevents Sharia from becoming a new form of priesthood that sanctifies individuals instead of texts.
Even scholars themselves continuously emphasize that they are human beings—fallible, correctable, not infallible nor monopolizers of truth. The core rule remains: “What matters is the evidence, not the status.”
This model does not resemble political Islam movements that raised religious slogans to gain power, nor does it resemble the medieval church that ruled in God's name.
It is closer to the prophetic state and the rightly guided caliphates, which upheld the religion without turning it into a tool for domination.
In short, Saudi Arabia is neither a “religious state” in the Western sense nor a “secular state” in the Eastern mold. It is a state with religious foundations, a modern system, guided by ijtihad, governed by Sharia, and restrained by conscience.
Because it resembles no other, it is often misunderstood:
Extremists and the uninformed call it “Western” because it modernizes regulations, builds alliances, and opens to global exchange. Some Western observers call it “religious” because it does not adopt their strict separation of faith and life. They struggle to accept a model that differs from their own.
They are free to categorize. But Saudi Arabia only cares about implementing what it believes. It does not raise slogans it cannot fulfill, nor does it pause to satisfy those who fail to understand it.
Here, action speaks louder than branding, and results matter more than rhetoric.
For Those Wondering: How Was This Unique Model of Governance Born?
How did its early features take shape? Why has it faced attempts at dismantling from the very beginning?
The answers take us back to a pivotal founding moment— When the First Saudi State (1744–1818 CE) was born in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, not as a tribal micro-state, but as an idea.
An idea that brought together the renewal of religion with the building of a state.
But why did it emerge? And why did it fall?
That is the story the next article will explore in depth.
Final Note:
This article has been ready since the beginning of the week, but I couldn’t find enough time to translate it. Tools like ChatGPT are still quite exhausting when it comes to long-form articles—often shortening them excessively or making changes I didn’t ask for. As a result, translating alone takes about three hours, sometimes more—time I rarely have in a busy schedule. Perhaps the delay in publishing over the past two days reflects that.
In closing, I hope this article is clear, useful, and offers a different perspective to those genuinely seeking to understand the Saudi model from within. You don’t have to agree with it—just understand it for what it truly is, without filters or mislabels.
Because some models are not meant to be explained by slogans… They’re best understood by how they’re practiced.
No comments:
Post a Comment