Friday, July 6, 2012
This post synchronizes the planned protests (Friday; 6 July) across Sudanese cities, against AlBasheer regime.. It was precisely meant for this venue, and prior to any results or developments.. It addresses the protest from a remote point of view, which assesses both pros and cons in a static stat..!
So, why euphoria in Sudan did not reach the public boiling point..?
Despite how AlBasheer regime had various scandals, atrocities and suppressions; the public response is almost cooling down, with less appetite for revolt and change. Despite the heat-up exercised by various fictions, and enthusiastic youth, people do not leave their homes and workplaces to protest and bring the forcible changes, as done earlier in Sudan and elsewhere.. What is the missing chip in this puzzle..?
Among the regime and the opponents, there are many principle issues to note..
Certainly, Security Forces had proven smart enough to avoid any bloodshed and serious causalities or fatalities during the days of protest. Number of detainees is limited compared to campaigns and demographics. They had learned the lessons of Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, and accordingly set their response plans. On the contrary, opponents were confused by this lean responses, unable to change tactics (which was built on provoking security till they violently respond), or to elevate the public support (which is usually triggered by bilateral violence). Security was also successful to disconnect the protests, disenable any large streams to be formed, while no on-ground opposition coordination was effectively active..
Obviously, Political and Operational Leadership of protest had serious miscarriages, despite the fierce campaigns on social media (which is reachable for no more than 10,000 activists), or the international campaigns across the globe (which have serious creditability quest to the national public). Political parties, opponent fictions and rebel groups are short to develop any reliable leadership. Therefore, slogans are beyond the public demand, roadmaps are extremely eloquent and public mode is notably calm rather than excited. Using the repeated slogans of Arabic Spring shakes the foundations of the protest, as those were products of Muslims Brotherhood bloc, who already rules Sudan..!
International Support for political change in Sudan is shy rather than busy. Activists disagree on how fundamental the international role is, in order to materialize national political changes. Syrian chronicles prove the same, as well as Libyan, Yemeni and Bahraini. Sudanese activists (and many others) are obsessed with the Egyptian Drama (which was in fact well orchestrated scenarios; with various players, advisors and observers) aiming at its advocated political changes. The likelihood to repeat this drama is greatly doubtful; considering the amount of uncertainties it had created. However, despite the enthusiastic voices, the Sudanese Quest is much simpler, defined and regulated than the Egyptian one..
Finally; the Epistemic Structure of Sudanese Politics is still immature; despite 3 public revolutions, 4 political regimes and uncounted numbers of military coups. Certainly, the low Human Development Stat justifies uprooted attempts to created mature, democratic and coherent systems. On the contrary, Sudan is partitioned and expected to witness more serious divides, rather than building up any form of sociopolitical governance. Deterioration of identity, declining of probabilities and uncertainty of approaches had collectively created stat of anarchy that supports the current opportunitists, frustrates the change activists and exhausts any helping hands, and certainly bore the public..!